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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CHOICE 
OF LAW: A CLIENT-BASED ALTERNATIVE TO 
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Colin Owyang* 
Because of the increasingly interstate nature of legal practice 
during the past few decades, practitioners licensed in multiple 
jurisdictions have been forced more frequently to confront choice-of-
law dilemmas in the area of professional responsibility. Although 
most states have adopted fairly uniform regulations on professional 
ethics, only the recently amended American Bar Association's Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct contain a specific provision that 
addresses the choice-of-law problem in the professional responsibili-
ty context. This Note outlines certain ethical considerations facing 
the multistate practitioner and argues that the choice-of-law 
provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides 
insufficient clarity and predictability where a lawyer must deter-
mine ex ante which state's professional responsibility regulations 
will apply to his actions. Specifically, this Note focuses on the 
future crime exception to the attorney-client privilege, discussing 
how the historical motivations for the privilege overlap with the 
prophylactic goals of the professional responsibility regula-
tions-both purport to protect the legally unsophisticated client 
from the intricacies of the adversarial system and its agents. This 
Note accordingly proposes a client-based alternative to the choice-
of-law provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
holding multistate practitioners accountable to the professional re-
sponsibility regulations of the state in which the client is domiciled. 
The proposed solution admittedly involves certain sacrifices and 
potential complications. In comparison to the current choice-of-law 
provision, however, the client-based rule provides a more certain 
and rational means of resolving choice-of-law dilemmas for the 
multistate practitioner in the area of professional responsibility. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, the multistate, or interstate, practice oflaw 
has become significantly more common.1 With the increasing 
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1. Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 
16 SETON HALL L. REV. 678, 678 (1986) (citing Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, 
Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 699, 699 (1975)). 
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sophistication of corporate entities, the greater complexity of 
commercial transactions, the pervasive application of federal 
law, and the varied state adoption of model codes and acts, 
attorneys who practice in multiple jurisdictions have found 
their clients and themselves subject to numerous and occasion-
ally conflicting legal obligations.2 For an attorney licensed to 
practice in multiple jurisdictions, performing services for 
clients with multistate legal interests requires ensuring not 
only that the clients' actions conform to all applicable legal 
conventions but also that the attorney's own behavior meets 
the professional ethical standards of each state in which he 
holds a license to practice. 
Occasionally, however, an attorney licensed in more than 
one state will find it impossible to conform her behavior to the 
ethical requirements of each of the states in which she holds 
a license.3 Where an attorney's ethical obligations directly con-
flict, the courts, legislatures, and commentators have provided 
little help in supplying a meaningful standard by which to 
resolve these ethical dilemmas. 4 At present, a majority of 
states have adopted some form of the American Bar Associa-
tion's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules), and a significant minority of states have adopted some 
version of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
(Model Code).5 The Model Code contains no provision that 
deals explicitly with choice of law,6 and the Model Rules did 
not contain such a provision until the amendment of Model 
Rule 8.5 in August 1993.7 As this Note will show, however, the 
recent amendment to the Model Rules offers little predictive 
clarity for the multistate practitioner whose ethical obligations 
conflict. 
2. See Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of Rules of 
Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States, 45 
Bus. LAW. 1229, 1229-30 (1990); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 678 & n.2; see also Leis v. 
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the changing 
nature oflegal practice); cf. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 
16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (citing increased personal and business activities 
conducted without regard to the existence of state boundaries, as well as changes in 
the rules governing in personam jurisdiction, as creating a growing strain on the 
choice-of-law system). 
3. E.g., Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Re-
sponses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1585 (1994) [hereinafter Developments]. 
4. O'Brien, supra note 1, at 681. 
5. Developments, supra note 3, at 1582. 
6. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). 
7. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b) (1994) with 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983). 
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This Note proposes a client-based approach to resolving 
choice-of-law problems in the area of professional responsibil-
ity for attorneys licensed to practice in multiple jurisdictions. 
Specifically, this Note addresses conflict-of-law issues that 
arise outside of proceedings before a court (nonproceedings) in 
the context of the future crime exception8 to the attorney-
client privilege. Part I discusses amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) 
as it applies to situations in which multistate practitioners 
participate in nonproceedings. Part II proposes a client-based 
choice-of-law rule and demonstrates how that rule would 
provide a clearer standard than the Model Rule. Part II also 
outlines how the proposed client-based rule advances one of 
the underlying policies of the rules of professional responsibili-
ty with respect to the attorney-client privilege, focusing on the 
types of interests and contacts emphasized by certain modern 
choice-of-Jaw approaches. In Part III, this Note outlines a 
hypothetical situation that presents a true conflict-a factual 
scenario that continues to challenge modern choice-of-law 
scholars. Part IV first discusses how Model Rule 8.5 would 
apply to the hypothetical situation and how that application 
would prove highly problematic. Part IV then applies the 
proposed client-based rule to the same hypothetical situation 
and demonstrates how that application proves clear and 
straightforward. Finally, this Note concludes that the proposed 
client-based rule, while not without its limitations, offers a 
significant improvement to Model Rule 8.5 and provides a 
viable and coherent way of resolving true conflicts of law in 
the area of professional responsibility. 
I. THE CURRENT CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION: 
MODEL RULE 8.5(B)(2) 
The 1993 amendments to the Model Rules added subsection 
(b) to Rule 8.5 to deal with choice-of-law issues in the area of 
8. Depending on the state, this exception either allows or requires the attorney 
to disclose her client's intent to commit certain types of crimes in the future. See, e.g., 
DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) (allowing attorneys to 
exercise judgment in deciding whether to disclose client's intentions, even if likely to 
result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harmn); N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994) (requiring attorneys to disclose client's intentions that 
might result in damage to life, limb, or property). 
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professional responsibility. 9 Where attorneys act outside of 
court proceedings, Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) provides: 
if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another 
jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules 
of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer prin-
cipally practices; provided, however, that if particular 
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, 
the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that 
conduct.10 
Neither the correct interpretation nor application of this 
Model Rule proves to be instantly clear. First, the Model Rule 
provides no guidelines to interpret the "principally practices" 
standard. One reasonably could define this phrase by the 
percentage of an attorney's clients domiciled in a given juris-
diction, the amount of the attorney's work performed in rela-
tion to the laws of a given jurisdiction, or the portion of an 
attorney's time devoted to projects involving the laws or 
clients of a given jurisdiction. Furthermore, an attorney could 
conceivably spend precisely equal amounts of time in more 
than one jurisdiction. Given these competing, yet reasonable, 
interpretations of the phrase "principally practices," Model 
Rule 8.5(b) appears susceptible to significant manipulation. 
Second, one would face additional difficulty in understand-
ing the "predominant effect" exception. An initial reading 
could suggest that Model Rule 8.5(b) focuses exclusively on the 
"predominant effect" of the attorney's "particular conduct,"11 
yet the comments to the rule suggest otherwise: 
The intention is for the [predominant effect] exception to 
be a narrow one. It would be appropriately applied, for 
example, to a situation in which a lawyer admitted in, and 
principally practicing in, State A, but also admitted in 
State B, handled an acquisition by a company whose 
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b) & cmts. 2-4 (1994). 
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994) (emphasis 
added). 
11. Since the Model Rules are aimed at influencing attorneys' behavior, the 
drafters probably intended the rule's language to refer to actions by attorneys. One 
commentary seems to have assumed as much since it fails to mention this source of 
potential ambiguity. See Deuelopments, supra note 3, at 1588-90. 
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headquarters and operations were in State B of another, 
similar such company. The exception would not appropri-
ately be applied, on the other hand, if the lawyer handled 
an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and 
operations were in State A of a company whose headquar-
ters and main operations were in State A, but which also 
had some operations in State B.12 
Despite somewhat confusing language, the commentary clearly 
would apply the "predominant effect" exception to the follow-
ing instance: the lawyer is admitted to practice in both States 
A and B; she principally practices in State A; she is retained 
by a company that operates and has its headquarters in State 
B; and that company wishes to acquire another company that 
also operates and has its headquarters in State B. The com-
mentary would not apply the predominant effect exception, 
however, to the same scenario if both companies operated and 
had headquarters in State A with only minor operations in 
State B. Yet the commentary offers no further explanation for 
its application of the "predominant effect" exception to only 
the first situation. The commentary gives no indication wheth-
er it applies in the former instance because the attorney's 
"particular conduct" occurs with respect to the laws of State B 
or because the client's "particular conduct" takes place in that 
state. One could reasonably read Model Rule 8.5 and its 
accompanying comments either way. 
The "predominant effect" language poses additional confu-
sion. Imagine a situation involving the future crime exception 
to the attorney-client privilege. 13 The attorney holds licenses 
from both state X, which recognizes the future crime excep-
tion, and state Z, which does not recognize any exceptions to 
the attorney-client privilege. Suppose also that the attorney 
learns that a client, a resident of state X, intends to defraud 
a partnership that operates under the laws of state X but 
whose partners are all domiciliaries of state Z. In this case, it 
is unclear whether the attorney's conduct would have its pre-
dominant effect in state X, where the partnership operates, or 
in state Z, where the impact of the financial injury would be 
felt by the individual partners. 
12. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 cmt. 4 (1994). 
13. Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) with N.J. 
R. OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994). 
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The interpretation of the "predominant effect" exception will 
have profound impacts on the attorney's conduct. If the attor-
ney's conduct were deemed to have its predominant effect in 
state X because state X had licensed the attorney, provided 
the legal residence of the partnership, and was the domicile of 
the client, then the ethical rules of state X would require the 
attorney to disclose his client's criminal intent. If, on the other 
hand, the attorney's conduct were determined to have its 
predominant effect in state Z because state Z also had licensed 
the attorney and because the actual economic harm would be 
suffered by partners who are domiciliaries of state Z, then the 
professional responsibility regulations of state Z would prohib-
it the attorney's disclosure of his client's intent. Thus, while 
interpretation of the "predominant effect" exception has obvi-
ous ramifications for the multistate practitioner, Model Rule 
8.5 lacks sufficient clarity to guide its application. 
One commentary has proposed elimination of the "predomi-
nant effect" exception as a partial solution to the ambiguity in 
Model Rule 8.5(b).14 That commentary focuses on the refer-
ential ambiguity of the "predominant effect" exception, noting 
that Model Rule 8.5 does not clarify whether the exception 
clause applies to the effect of the attorney's conduct on the 
client or on the public.15 In the context of the future crime 
exception to the attorney-client privilege, the referential ambi-
guity may prove determinative. 
Consider the following situation. A client, domiciled in state 
X, intends to commit a crime in state Z, and he discloses that 
intention to his attorney, who is licensed to practice in both 
states. If state X would forbid disclosure while state Z would 
require it, in which state would the predominant effect of the 
attorney's conduct occur? This determination will be important 
to the attorney who seeks to avoid being disciplined for violat-
ing the attorney-client privilege in state X. Without further 
specificity, applying the Model Rule's exception proves diffi-
cult. Although subsequent case law may eventually eliminate 
the ambiguity, the Model Rule at present lacks sufficient 
clarity to guide the conduct of multistate practitioners.16 
Although the cited commentary makes an important obser-
vation, it accurately notes that its own proposed test "also 
14. Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-90. 
15. Id. at 1588. 
16. See id. 
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presents some ambiguity" and does little to further the goal of 
establishing a clear choice-of-law rule. 17 Elimination of the 
"predominant effect" exception would still leave the equally 
ambiguous and problematic "principally practices" standard of 
general application. The justification for the elimination of the 
"predominant effect" exception is that it would provide in-
creased ex ante certainty18 but this reasoning is circular. The 
adoption of any coherent choice-of-law rule will yield the same 
ex ante certainty as any other such rule, provided that the rule 
subsequently is applied with uniformity. 19 Model Rule 8.5(b) 
fails as a satisfactory rule because its intrinsic ambiguities 
preclude consistent interpretation and, consequently, uniform 
application. Although certainty might evolve during the adju-
dication of cases brought under Model Rule 8.5(b), relying on 
case-by~case analysis to clarify the rule would defeat the 
purpose of adopting any bright-line rule at all. 20 
II. A CLIENT-BASED APPROACH TO 
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM 
In light of the ambiguities contained in Model Rule 8.5 and 
the lack of any choice-of-law provision in the Model Code, this 
Note proposes a client-based rule for the nonproceeding situa-
tion contemplated by Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). Where a 
multistate practitioner acts outside of a court proceeding, and 
where a true conflict of law arises as to the scope of the at-
torney-client privilege, this Note advocates applying the law 
of the state in which the client is domiciled at the time the 
potentially disclosable communication occurs. 
The proposed client-based rule offers several advantages. 
First, it provides a clearer standard than amended Model Rule 
8.5(b)(2)(ii). The clarity of the client-based rule likely will 
result in a degree of certainty and uniformity that will give 
meaning and substance to the attorney-client privilege.21 
17. Id. at 1589. 
18. See id. 
19. See Baxter, supra note 2, at 2-4 (distinguishing between primary and second-
ary certainty). 
20. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-89. 
21. See generally Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 943-51 (1991) (discussing 
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This certainty arguably is threatened by the dependence of 
the client-based rule on the potentially difficult-to-apply con-
cept of "domicile," which may itself be a problematic factor, 
given its technical nature.22 Although one rightfully may attack 
the intricacies that sometimes impede a clear determination 
of a person's domicile, our legal system tolerates the concept 
and relies upon it in many areas of law.23 The continued use 
of the domicile concept suggests that courts and scholars have 
become sufficiently comfortable with its operation so that its 
future application will not prove unduly burdensome or prob-
lematic. To use the attack on domicile, without more, to reject 
the client-based rule would be to call into question many areas 
of the law that similarly rely on a determination of domicile for 
their effective enforcement. 
Second, the client-based rule advances one of the primary 
objectives of the attorney-client privilege-protection of the 
client.24 Despite mixed historical rationales, modern commen-
tators justify the attorney-client privilege as the sine qua non 
of the adversarial system. 25 One commentator has written: 
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal 
element of the modern American lawyer's professional 
functions. It is considered indispensable to the lawyer's 
function as advocate on the theory that the advocate can 
adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to 
disclose everything, bad as well as good. The privilege is 
the need for a rule that promotes greater certainty and predictability than case-by-
case adjudication in the area of attorney-client privilege); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 
714, 720-21 (discussing the goals of certainty and predictability advanced by modem 
choice-of-law theory). 
22. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING 
CONFLICTS OF LA w 5 (2d ed. 1993) ("Determining domicile can be a subtle and elusive 
task, and the result may easily be one about which reasonable persons-and 
judges-might disagree."); id. at 12 ("The flexibility of the concept [of domicile] permits 
its manipulation .... "). See generally id. at 5-12 (presenting a summary of the 
requirements of domicile). 
23. See id. at 5 (noting that domicile is the basis for jurisdiction in divorce and 
ordinary civil actions; for taxing incomes and estates; and for determining applicable 
law in interstate successions). 
24. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM 2 (1975) (discussing the need for confidentiality as a procedural safeguard 
against error in the search for truth that theoretically underlies the adversary 
system); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to 
Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1985) (suggesting that the absence of 
confidentiality would sacrifice the client's rights and his individual autonomy). 
25. E.g., Bradford, supra note 21, at 913-14. 
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also considered necessary to the lawyer's function as 
confidential counselor in law on the similar theory that the 
legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do 
only if the client is free to make full disclosure. 26 
The protection afforded by the confidentiality of the attorney-
client privilege allows the client to communicate with his legal 
counselor in a manner that will allow the attorney to best 
represent her client's interest. The privilege prevents the client 
from incriminating himself in front of a court or an adversary, 
while allowing his attorney to prepare the best possible repre-
sentation of the client with the benefit of complete disclosure 
of relevant information. In sum, the attorney-client privilege 
exists to further the client's interests as a participant in a 
system of justice that involves adversarial ethics. 
To serve the prophylactic goal of the attorney-client privi-
lege; certainty and predictability prove essential.27 According 
to the Supreme Court, 
[l]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be 
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict 
with some degree of certainty whether particular discus-
sions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one 
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege 
at all. 28 
A bright-line rule promotes greater certainty than case-by-
case adjudication because it provides the parties with predict-
26. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney·Client 
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978). 
27. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-89 (noting that "confidentiality 
requires certainty to further its goals and purposesn). Departures from a clear rule 
that defines the attorney-client privilege in individual cases might seem necessary 
or even proper, but the resultant lack of uniformity of the rule's application and 
enforcement would produce an uncertainty that would undermine the purposes of the 
privilege altogether. See id. Although the clarity of a bright-line rule offers advan-
tages outside of the privilege context, id. (citing Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: 
Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 468-69 
(1977)), the benefits of a bright-line rule in the privilege context prove especially 
significant. Bradford, supra note 21, at 912, 937, 945. 
28. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). See also Bradford, 
supra note 21, at 943 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege will only foster 
communications between the attorney and client if both parties know at the time of 
their communications whether and to what extent the privilege will apply). 
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ability regarding the future ramifications and treatment of 
their present actions.29 
While the client-based rule may protect the client, it sacri-
fices an important function of the future crime excep-
tion-protecting the public interest in deterring intended 
crimes. This tension between the interests of the individual 
and society at large often exists in the search for a workable 
and just legal principle. Without a universally acceptable 
normative standard, however, attempting to justify a choice-of-
law rule that favors either the client or the public would 
produce interminable debate on the merits of the appropriate 
public policy. This Note declines to invite that discussion and 
instead recognizes that the current choice-of-law provision 
embodied in Model Rule 8.5 presents serious pragmatic diffi-
culties.30 A domicile-centered rule at least focuses on the 
client, which is consistent with the policies underlying the 
attorney-client privilege and the professional responsibility 
regulations. By applying the law of the client's domicile, the 
proposed client-based rule provides a more certain, predict-
able, and rational approach than the existing rule. These 
improvements sufficiently justify consideration of the merits 
of the proposed client-based rule. 
The client-based rule also advances another purpose under-
lying the rules of professional responsibility: the protection of 
the reasonable expectations of the client as a layperson.31 The 
preamble to the Model Rules establishes that the legal pro-
fession serves a quasi-governmental function by self-regulation 
and that the ethical guidelines exist as a means of protecting 
the public interest.32 In the absence of the judiciary-as when 
a lawyer acts in non proceedings-the lawyer has a responsibil-
29. This so-called "primary predictability" constitutes "a [choice-of-law] goal 
worthy of pursuit [that] few would deny." Baxter, supra note 2, at 3. Yet primary 
predictability alone "is an inadequate normative basis for traditional choice-of-law 
rules." Id. {emphasis added). For a more thorough discussion of the merits of 
predictability and uniformity as justifications for choice-of-law rules, see id. at 2-4. 
See also Bradford, supra note 21, at 943-51 {discussing the need for a rule that 
promotes greater certainty and predictability than case-by-case adjudication in the 
area of attorney-client privilege); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 714, 720-21 {discussing . 
the goals of certainty and predictability advanced by modern choice-of-law theory). 
30. See supra Part I. 
31. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 3 {discussing the obligations of a 
criminal defense attorney to protect her legally unsophisticated client from the 
potential harm of the truth-finding process embodied in criminal trials). 
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble§§ 8-12 (1994); see also 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1981). 
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ity to the public to provide a certain quality of justice.33 In 
such situations outside the purview of the court, the law of the 
client's domicile should apply because it best protects the 
reasonable expectations of the client. It is the law with which 
the client will most likely be familiar34 and, accordingly, the 
law to which the client will expect to be held accountable. 35 
Third, focusing on the client and his domicile is consistent 
with the theoretical emphases in certain modern choice-of-law 
approaches. Three modern theories prove illustrative. The first 
is Professor Currie's governmental interest analysis.36 
Currie based his system upon the observation that law 
is purposive in nature-that those who made the law 
sought to serve various social goals .... [He] argued, in 
choice-of-law decision-making, the governmental interests 
of each jurisdiction in having its law applied should be 
considered. That procedure helps insure that a law will not 
be applied to the problem unless applying the law would 
achieve a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promul-
gated the law. 37 
The rationale behind the client-based rule follows Professor 
Currie's theoretical instruction. Although, as noted, a consid-
eration of the "governmental interests of each jurisdiction" 
reveals a tension between the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege and the policy concerns motivating the future crime 
exception, application of the client-based rule clearly does 
"achieve a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promul-
gated the law." Applying the law of the client's domicile fur-
thers the policy of the client's state, allowing that state's laws 
to serve their intended "social goals." 
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble § 1 (1994) {providing 
that a "lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice"); cf MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981) {stating that "[b]ecause of [a 
lawyer's] position in society ... respect for the law should be more than a platitude"). 
34. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 910 {Cal. 1961) {"Unless [the 
parties] could rely on their own law, they would have to look to the laws of all of the 
jurisdictions to which [the other party] might move regardless of where he was 
domiciled .... "). 
35. See HERBERT F. GoODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 261-62 {3d 
ed. 1949). 
36. For a complete introduction to Professor Currie's governmental interest 
analysis, see Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of 
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171. 
37. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 212. 
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The client-based rule also applies the type of tie-breaking 
analysis advanced in Professor Baxter's comparative impair-
ment approach.38 Professor Baxter recognizes two types of 
governmental objectives: internal and external.39 Where a 
choice-of-law problem arises, "the external objective of one 
state must be subordinated [to that of the other]."40 Essen-
tially, "[t]he principle is to subordinate, in the particular case, 
the external objective of the state whose internal objective will 
be least impaired in general scope and impact by subordina-
tion in cases like the one at hand."41 
The client-based rule contemplates the type of comparative 
impairment approach suggested by Professor Baxter by prop-
erly considering the conflicting state objectives with respect to 
the attorney-client privilege and the future crime exception. A 
comparison of governmental objectives, however, merely un-
covers the conflicting policies of the attorney-client privilege 
and the future crime exception. The client-based rule advances 
the underlying, client-protective purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege and of the professional responsibility regulations. In 
other words, the client-based rule reflects the conclusion that 
the objectives of both the attorney-client privilege and the 
professional responsibility regulations would be impaired more 
than the policy goals of the future crime exception if the 
client-based rule were not applied. While one may dispute the 
merits of this conclusion on normative grounds, the proposed 
client-based rule does incorporate the type of comparative 
impairment analysis that Professor Baxter recommended to 
resolve conflicts of law. 
The client-based rule also contemplates the analytical focus 
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The Second 
Restatement's approach involves a two-step process.42 First, a 
38. For a detailed introduction to comparative impairment, see Baxter, supra 
note 2. 
39. Internal objectives represent those governmental goals that motivate a 
state's approach to resolving conflicts among private interests. Id. at 17. These 
interests exist even in wholly domestic disputes. Id. External governmental objectives 
arise when a transaction affects persons of different states. Id. "They are the 
objectives of each state to make effective, in all situations involving persons as to 
whom it has responsibility for legal ordering, that resolution of contending private 
interests the state has made for local purposes.• Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 18. Another commentary has restated Professor Baxter's proposition: 
"true conflicts [of law] could be resolved by comparing the extent of impairment of 
each state's policy and applying the law whose policy would be most impaired if it 
were not applied." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 221. 
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1988). 
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court, subject to constitutional restrictions, should apply a 
statutory choice-of-law rule, if one exists.43 In the absence of 
such a statutory directive, the Second Restatement in effect 
prescribes application of the law of the state that has "the 
most significant relationship" with the situation presented.44 
The determination of the most significant relationship involves 
consideration of seven factors,45 which "can be organized into 
three basic topics: governmental interests, party interests, and 
interests involving the administration of justice. "46 
Application of the client-based rule entails consideration of 
the types of interests examined under the framework of the 
Second Restatement. Analyzing the governmental and party 
interests in a conflicts situation, one finds the previously 
described dilemma posed by the competing purposes of the 
attorney-client privilege and the future crime exception; the 
former protects the client, a party interest, but the latter 
protects the public, a governmental interest. Although apply-
ing the law of the client's domicile sacrifices the concern of the 
future crime exception in order to advance the purposes of the 
attorney-client privilege and the professional responsibility 
regulations, the client-based rule furthers the goals of certain-
ty and predictability and is relatively easy to administer. The 
justification for the rule thus reflects proper attention to the 
types of interests emphasized by the Second Restatement. 
Finally, the client-based rule offers an additional advantage 
in that the rule prevents the legally sophisticated client from 
manipulating applicable ethical regulations to the client's 
advantage by forum shopping. Commentators often have 
manifested a concern that manipulative efforts of legally 
43. Id. § 6(1). 
44. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 195. 
45. The factors are: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests 
of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field oflaw, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 6(2) (1988). 
46. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 196. 
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sophisticated parties could frustrate an imprudent choice-of-
law standard because these parties simply would bring suit in 
a jurisdiction whose laws would favor the desired outcome.47 
In the context of nonproceedings, forum shopping continues 
to present a concern. Consider, for example, an alternative to 
the client-based rule, application of the law of the state that 
licenses the attorney. For a multistate practitioner, the lawyer 
could simply designate a "home-base" state from among the 
states in which she is licensed. So long as the attorney made 
adequate ex ante disclosure, the parties could rely on application 
of the laws of the home-base state to their interactions, and 
legally sophisticated clients could choose lawyers based on the 
applicable state ethical codes. A client could choose a lawyer 
whose home-base state has a narrow future crime exception in 
order to avoid the burden of the broader future crime exception 
imposed by the state in which the client is domiciled,48 thus 
escaping the laws that the legislature of his state has enacted. 
The client-based rule would not encourage such manipulative 
behavior, because the client would properly remain subject to 
the laws of the state in which he was domiciled. 
III. WHERE THE PROPOSED STANDARD MIGHT APPLY: 
A NOT-SO-HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT OF LAW 
This Part outlines a hypothetical situation, analyzing the 
application of the statutes of two states, Delaware and New 
Jersey, in which the client's disclosure implicates the future 
47. See, e.g., id. at 219 (noting that pure interest analysis as a choice-of-law 
method would encourage forum-shopping) (citing Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: 
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845 (1961)). 
But see Bradford, supra note 21, at 951 (arguing that state ethical obligations are 
unlikely to influence a client's choice of attorney). 
48. This option becomes especially threatening in light of states like Maryland, 
whose ethics committee has declared that an attorney's conduct in a foreign jurisdiction 
will be considered "ethical per sen ifthe attorney conforms to the Code of Professional 
Responsibility of that foreign jurisdiction. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1587 
(citing Md. Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 86-28, at 3 (1985)). In other words, if an 
attorney chose Maryland as her "home-base,n she could avoid sanctions by the Maryland 
Committee on Ethics simply by conforming her conduct to the ethical regulations of 
any foreign jurisdiction in which she practiced, regardless of whether she was licensed 
by that foreign jurisdiction. A client could not, therefore, rely on the application of 
Maryland's professional responsibility regulations to the attorney's conduct. This 
uncertainty could undermine the client's ability to predict and plan around the 
attorney's future conduct. 
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crime exception to the attorney-client privilege. In the Dela-
ware-New Jersey hypothetical, the attorney is licensed to 
practice in both states.49 The client is domiciled in Delaware 
and reveals his intention to defraud a corporate secured 
creditor in New Jersey.50 Both Delaware and New Jersey have 
substantially identical statutes that designate such fraud as 
a crime.51 In addition, Delaware and New Jersey both have 
adopted some version of the Model Rules, 52 though the adopted 
versions differ as to the scope and terms of the future crime 
exception. 
In Delaware, Model Rule 1.6 generally prohibits attorneys 
from disclosing client confidences without client consent. 53 The 
future crime exception is limited and discretionary, providing 
that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client 
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is 
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm."54 Delaware's rule implicitly endorses a state policy that 
favors client confidences over threats to public safety that do 
not involve life or limb. 
One should note two characteristics of Delaware's future 
crime exception. First, the lawyer may only disclose her cli-
ent's criminal intent where the contemplated criminal act, in 
the lawyer's opinion, would likely result in "imminent death 
or substantial bodily harm." Delaware thus absolutely prohib-
its its lawyers from disclosing their client's criminal intentions 
49. The hypothetical intentionally involves an attorney who is admitted to prac-
tice, either regularly or pro hac vice, in both jurisdictions to avoid the important, but 
distinct, jurisdictional difficulties in determining which state would have proper 
jurisdiction to discipline the attorney. By licensing the attorney in both Delaware and 
New Jersey, the jurisdictional question is properly avoided, as it is beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
50. One might challenge the general relevance of the client-based rule, because 
this Note only tests its application to a specific hypothetical scenario. The client-
based rule would likely encounter significant difficulty in resolving a conflicts 
situation in which a multistate practitioner has several clients from numerous 
domiciles who together intend to commit a conspiratorial crime or fraud. Although 
this situation would pose a significant challenge to the viability of the client-based 
rule, such a scenario seems sufficiently unlikely so as to justify postponement of its 
consideration. 
51. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 891 (Supp. 1994) with N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:21-12 (West 1982). 
52. Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT with N.J. R. PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT. 
53. DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(a) (1995). 
54. DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
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if those intentions would not result in damage to a person's 
life or limb. 55 Second, even if the client's intended acts would 
endanger life or limb, the rule is discretionary and allows the 
attorney licensed to practice in Delaware to exercise her 
judgment in deciding whether to· disclose her client's inten-
tions. 
Like Delaware, New Jersey imposes a general prohibition on 
attorneys' disclosure of client confidences.56 New Jersey's 
future crime exception, however, is mandatory and broader in 
scope, providing that 
[a) lawyer shall reveal such information . . . as soon as, 
and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary, to prevent the client ... from committing a criminal, 
illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of another. 57 
Compared to the Delaware rule, New Jersey's rule favors the 
state's interest in protecting public safety and private property 
over client confidentiality. Consequently, New Jersey requires 
its licensed attorneys to disclose client confidences in a broad-
er range of circumstances which pose a threat to life, limb, or 
property. 
Comparing this rule to Delaware's, one should make two 
observations. First, this rule is mandatory. While the New 
Jersey rule still allows the lawyer to exercise his judgment in 
determining what he "reasonably believes [to be) necessary, to 
prevent the client" from committing the enumerated acts, once 
the lawyer has made such a determination, he then shall 
reveal that information.58 Unlike the Delaware provision, the 
New Jersey rule leaves the lawyer no discretion in deciding 
whether to disclose his client's criminal, illegal, or fraudulent 
intentions. Second, the scope of the New Jersey future crime 
exception is much broader than that of Delaware. The New 
Jersey rule requires the lawyer to disclose information that 
55. For example, the Delaware Model Rules of Professional Conduct would not 
sanction even discretionary disclosure by an attorney of a client's criminal intentions 
where the intended act only threatened property interests. Compare DEL. LAWYERS' 
R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995) with DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995). 
56. N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1994). 
57. N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1994) (emphasis added). 
58. N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1994). 
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would prevent criminal, illegal, and fraudulent acts that might 
result in damage to life, limb, financial interest, or property of 
another. In other words, where the Delaware rule would allow 
its lawyer to disclose her client's criminal intentions that 
might result in injury to life or limb, the New Jersey rule 
would require its attorney to disclose his client's intent to 
commit a criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that would result 
in damage to life, limb, or property. 69 
The Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical consequently pres-
ents an apparent true conflict.60 The relevant interests are 







Attorney cannot disclose 
client's intent 
Narrow future crime excep-
tion favors greater client 
confidentiality, except when 
personal injury or human 




Future fraud location 
Attorney must disclose 
client's intent 
Broad future crime, 
fraud, and illegal activity 
exception favors state's 
interest in protecting 
public safety and private 
property interests 
59. Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) with N.J. 
R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994). 
60. The late Professor Brainerd Currie outlined the theoretical foundation for a 
choice-of-law approach now commonly known as governmental interest analysis. See 
Currie, supra note 36. His article identified three situations that posed significant 
challenges to courts and choice-of-law scholars. Id. at 171-72. At least one of those 
identified situations, the true conflict, remains a source of highly problematic choice-of-
law issues and continues to form the basis for much modern choice-of-law scholarship. 
E.g., Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Rlusions in the 
Conflict of Laws, 30 liAsTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative 
Impairment to Resollle True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 
CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980); Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the 
Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245 (1991); John J. Wasilczyk, Note, Conflict 
of Laws: Choice of Law for True Conflicts, 65 CAL. L. REV. 290 (1977). 
A true conflict arises when the laws of more than one state could apply and the 
application of the law of any one state would advance the policy of that state. RICHMAN 
& REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 213. Developing a coherent choice-of-law theory that 
satisfactorily resolves the true conflict situation, while also avoiding normative value 
preferences, has proven the basis for much choice-of-law scholarship, though little 
agreement has resulted. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 2; Currie, supra note 36; Kramer, 
supra. 
61. For a discussion of diagramming conflicts-of-law analysis, see William M. 
Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of Interest Analysis, 43 
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Application of Delaware's law would advance the policy of 
Delaware's narrow future crime exception, which entitles the 
client to confidential communications unless that client's 
criminal intentions pose a risk of imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm.62 Conversely, New Jersey's law, if ap-
plied, would further New Jersey's broad future crime, fraud, 
and illegal activity exception that favors the state's interest in 
protecting public safety and private property over the client's 
interest in confidential communications.63 Delaware's policy 
seeks to protect its client-domiciliary by preserving client 
confidentiality,64 while New Jersey's policy aims at protecting 
the property interests that are threatened by the client's 
intended and illegal act. 65 
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT POSED BY THE 
DELAWARE-NEW JERSEY HYPOTHETICAL 
A. Applying Model Rule 8.5 
As the discussion in Part I indicated, Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) 
emphasizes two criteria in making the choice-of-law determi-
nation. The rule relies exclusively on where the lawyer princi-
pally practices and where the predominant effect of particular 
conduct occurs. 66 The rules of the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer principally practices will apply unless the predominant 
effect occurs in another jurisdiction, in which case the rules of 
that jurisdiction will apply.67 Given the interests in the hypo-
thetical, the following permutations appear: 
OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1982); Joseph W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. 
L. REV. 731 (1990). 
62. See DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995). 
63. See N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994). 
64. See DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995). 
65. See N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(l) (1994). 
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994). 
67. Id. For a discussion of the rule's potential ambiguities, see supra Part I. 
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Principally Predominant 
Practice Effect Rules Applied 
1) Delaware Delaware Delaware 
2) Delaware New Jersey New Jersey 
3) New Jersey New Jersey New Jersey 
4) New Jersey Delaware Delaware 
Table I 
Consider how Model Rule· 8.5(b){2)(ii) would apply to the 
Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical. As noted in Part I, it 
initially would be difficult even to determine where the lawyer 
principally practiced. Let us assume, however, that a lawyer 
is deemed to practice principally in the state where most of 
his clients are domiciled or incorporated.68 Let us also assume 
that, for the purposes of the hypothetical, that state is Dela-
ware, thus confining the analysis to rows one and two of 
Table 1. 
In the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical, the fraud will 
take place in New Jersey. This occurrence might mean that, 
under Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), the lawyer's conduct would 
have its predominant effect in New Jersey. If so, then the 
analysis in row two of Table 1 would apply the rules of New 
Jersey to the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical. The future 
occurrence of a fraud in New Jersey arguably would justify the 
application of New Jersey's rules to a transaction between a 
Delaware domiciliary and a lawyer licensed by both Delaware 
and New Jersey. 
Recalling the language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), however, 
one must ask whether New Jersey, as the future site of an 
illegal act, qualifies as the jurisdiction in which the "particu-
lar conduct clearly has its predominant effect"69 -assuming, 
albeit problematically,70 that the client's conduct constitutes 
the "particular conduct" in question for the purpose of the 
Model Rule. If so, then the analysis in row two of Table 1 
still indicates that New Jersey's rules will apply and that, as 
68. This standard may prove both unworkable and unrealistic. Some standard, 
however, is necessary to test the plausibility of Model Rule 8.5, and the chosen one 
seems as plausible as the other methods suggested in Part I. 
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994) (empha-
sis added). 
70. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the "particular conductn phrase, see 
supra Part I. 
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a consequence, the lawyer in the hypothetical will be required 
to disclose his client's intentions "to the proper authorities."71 
By making that disclosure, however, the lawyer in the 
Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical conceivably would be 
breaching his obligations under the Delaware rules if he 
considered Delaware to be the jurisdiction in which his "partic-
ular conduct clearly has its predominant effect," because it 
would be that jurisdiction that would discipline him for his 
breach of conduct. 72 By this analysis, row one of Table 1 
indicates that Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) would apply the rules of 
Delaware to the situation envisioned by the Delaware-New 
Jersey hypothetical. Consequently, the lawyer would be forbid-
den from disclosing his client's intent to defraud a New Jersey 
corporate secured creditor. As this example illustrates, deter-
mining which state's rules will apply thus depends on how the 
predominant effect exception is interpreted-a task that is not 
adequately informed by Model Rule 8.5.73 
Part I referred to one commentary that recommended elimi-
nating the "predominant effect" exception and applying the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally prac-
tices. 74 Adopting that recommendation, however, seems to 
produce potentially inequitable results. If one were to adopt a 
careless method of determining where a lawyer is deemed 
principally to practice, the applicable law conceivably could 
vary, even though much of the underlying substance of the 
transaction in the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical would 
remain the same. The hypothetical situation would still in-
volve a Delaware client who intends to commit a fraud in New 
Jersey, but the applicable law would depend on where the 
lawyer is deemed principally to practice-a determination that 
the client might never know and that the lawyer might find 
difficult, if not impossible, to make. 
71. N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1994). 
72. This perspective assumes that the Model Rule intends to refer to the lawyer's 
particular conduct, which may not necessarily be the case. For a discussion of this 
ambiguity, see supra Part I. 
73. See Deuelopments, supra note 3, at 1588-90. 
74. Id. 
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B. Applying the Client-Based Rule 
Although Model Rule 8.5 involves significant pragmatic 
difficulties when applied to the Delaware-New Jersey hypo-
thetical, the client-based rule offers a simple and straightfor-
ward alternative; it requires the application of Delaware law 
since the client is domiciled in that state. Consequently, 
Delaware's Model Rule 1.6 would forbid the attorney from 
disclosing his client's intent to perpetrate a fraud on a corpo-
rate secured creditor in New Jersey. 
Although application of the client-based rule proves un-
problematic, its result in the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical 
raises some important and valid concerns. Application of Dela-
ware's law results in New Jersey's interest in public safety and 
private property-which probably motivated New Jersey's 
passage of its broad future crime and illegal activity excep-
tion-being subordinated to Delaware's interest in nearly 
absolute client confidentiality. Again, one encounters the con-
flict between the interests of the individual (the client) and the 
interests of the public.75 
The proposed client-based i:ule is not an uncontroversial 
solution to the choice-of-law problems which confront the 
multijurisdictional practitioner. As noted, the tension between 
the individual and society at large always exists in the search 
for a workable and just legal principle. Deciding which interest 
ought to prevail proves impossible without passing normative 
judgment on the merits of either side, a determination beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
Model Rule 8.5, however, presents significant practical diffi-
culties that could produce inequitable results. The client-based 
rule, by focusing on the client, furthers one of the policies 
underlying the professional responsibility regulations. More 
importantly, however, applying the law of the client's domicile 
is more certain, predictable, and rational than the existing rule. 
While the client-based rule does not represent the singular 
solution to the choice-of-law problems facing multijurisdiction-
al practitioners, the improvements offered by the client-based 
rule-increased certainty, predictability, and rationality-justify 
consideration of its merits. 
75. See supra Part II. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note has proposed a choice-of-law rule as an alterna-
tive to Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). The proposed client-based rule 
eliminates the ambiguity of the Model Rule and provides 
greater certainty and predictability. In addition, the client-
based rule furthers the purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege, one of the primary goals of the professional responsibility 
regulations, and focuses on the types of interests and contacts 
emphasized by at least three modern choice-of-law approaches. 
Yet, despite these advantages, even the proposed client-based 
rule demonstrates that "any rule of choice of law, like any 
other common law rule, represents an accommodation of 
conflicting values. "76 One state's policies must invariably yield 
to those of another. In the choice-of-law world of the second 
best, however, this Note offers a significant improvement to 
the present rule and provides a plausible and rational method 
of resolving true conflicts of law among state professional 
responsibility regulations for multistate practitioners. 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (1971). 
